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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Torts-STRICT LIABILITY FOR HAZARDOUS USE OF ONE'S LAND-IM-
POUNDING PHOSPHATE SLIMES IN RESERVOIR Is NON-NATURAL USE OF
LANDS-ESCAPE OF SLIMES INVOKES DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY.-
Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
On December 3, 1971, a dam burst at a phosphate mine operated
by Cities Service Company in Polk County, Florida. Approximately
1 billion gallons of phosphate slimes retained in a settling pond
escaped into Whidden Creek. The slimes reached the Peace River,
"killing countless numbers of fish and inflicting other damage. '
The State of Florida filed suit against Cities Service Company,
seeking injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. The
trial court granted a temporary injunction and struck the claim for
punitive damages. 2 Subsequently, the trial court entered an order
granting the state's motion for partial summary judgment on liability.
The court stated that Cities Service maintained the slime ponds at
its peril and was liable for damages caused by the escaping slimes-
regardless of fault.3 Cities Service Company took an interlocutory ap-
peal. In Cities Service Co. v. State4 the Second District Court
of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The district
court concluded that "the Cities Service slime reservoir constituted
a non-natural use of the land such as to invoke the doctrine of strict
liability."5 The court expressly adopted the Rylands v. Fletcher6
doctrine of strict liability for the hazardous use of land, a doctrine
never previously recognized by the Florida appellate courts.
1. Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 800 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
2. Id. These two points were not raised on appeal.
3. Order, State v. Cities Service Co., No. 71-4273 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Polk County,
Nov. 8, 1974).
4. 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
5. Id. at 803.
6. [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330, afj'g [1866] L.R. 1 Ex. 265.
7. 312 So. 2d at 800. The Cities Service court stated that Pensacola Gas Co. v.
Pebley, 5 So. 593 (Fla. 1889), implies acceptance of the Rylands doctrine. In Pensacola
Gas Co., the plaintiff claimed damages when a neighboring landowner constructed a
gas works and allowed polluted water to spill and sink through the sand. The filthy
water entered the common ground water and polluted the plaintiff's well. The Florida
Supreme Court, affirming judgment for the plaintiff stated:
The appellant gas company had the right to use the water in and about the
gas-works as they pleased, but they had no right to allow the filthy water to
escape from their premises, and to enter the land of their neighbors. It was the
duty of the company to confine the refuse from their works so that it could
not enter upon and injure their neighbors, and if they did so it was done at
their peril; the escape of the refuse filthy water being in itself an evidence of
negligence on the part of the gas company, Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 . ...
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In Rylands v. Fletcher, the defendants were millowners who con-
structed a reservoir upon their land. The water penetrated the shaft
of an abandoned coal mine, and flooded along connecting passages
into the plaintiff's adjoining coal mine. The defendant millowners
were held liable for the damages even though they were not negligent.
Justice Blackburn, in the Exchequer Chamber, stated:
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his
own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there any-
thing likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril,
and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage
which is the natural consequence of its escape. 8
Justice Blackburn's statement was severely limited in the House
of Lords. In Lord Cairn's opinion, the principle applied to a non-
natural use of the defendant's land, but not to "any purpose for
which it might in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of land be
used .... .. The Cities Service court recognized the generally
5 So. at 595. This language was quoted by the Cities Service court, which failed to note
the implication of negligence on the part of the gas company. However, the Cities
Service court did note the citation to Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868), one of the
first American decisions acknowledging Rylands. The Pensacola Gas Co. court itself did
not once cite Rylands.
The Cities Service court also referred to two Florida circuit court judgments regard-
ing factual situations strikingly similar to that of the subject case. 312 So. 2d at 801. In
Ague v. American Agricultural Chem. Co., 5 Fla. Supp. 133 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Hills-
borough County, March 17, 1953), the plaintiffs brought an "action against defendant
for damages claimed to have been suffered by them to their property by reason of the
escape of phosphate washings, dirt, slush and the like from a reservoir constructed
and maintained by defendant on adjoining property in connection with a phosphate
mining plant." 5 Fla. Supp. at 133-34. The Ague court refused to apply the Rylands rule,
and it limited the plaintiff's cause of action to the ground of negligence.
Sixteen years later, in Caldwell v. American Cyanamid Co., 32 Fla. Supp. 163 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Hillsborough County, Jan. 2, 1969), the plaintiffs made "allegations of damages to
plaintiffs' property when slimes, waters and mud refuse collected and maintained on
defendant's lands behind dikes and other man-made works escaped and flowed onto
the property of the plaintiffs and into the Alafia River adjoining the property ....
Id at 163. This time the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County stated:
There being no appellate authority to the contrary in Florida, this court is of
the opinion that the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, as limited to the "non-
natural" use of land, is supported by the weight of authority in this country;
is a logical doctrine, consistent with established principles of law; and that the
motions to dismiss the first counts should be denied.
Id. at 165.
The Cities Service court referred to no other Florida decisions.
8. Fletcher v. Rylands, [1866] L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279.
9. Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 338-39. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 78, at 505 (4th ed. 1971). See also Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co.,
323 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Mass. 1975); 2 HARPER & JAmES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.2 (1956);
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accepted limitation, then premised its adoption of Rylands on two
grounds. First, the court considered the weight of authority through-
out America. It concluded that a majority of American jurisdictions
accept the Rylands doctrine. 0 Second, the court considered the social
utility of the doctrine. It noted that dangerous enterprises involving
a high degree of risk to others were once indispensable to the com-
mercial and industrial growth of a new country. But the court con-
cluded that, while certain dangerous activities still have economic
utility, it is now time for those who maintain hazardous activities to
be made the insurers of the concomitant risks."
Having adopted the Rylands doctrine, the court attempted to de-
termine the rule's applicability to Cities Service Company's main-
tenance of the slime reservoir. Since the court acknowledged that
application of the doctrine is limited to non-natural use of the
land, it first had to decide whether Cities Service Company was
making a non-natural use of its property.
Non-natural use is a nebulous concept, and is variously defined.
Generally, a non-natural activity is "the thing out of place, the ab-
normally dangerous condition or activity which is not a 'natural'
one where it is."12 The Cities Service court apparently equated the
term "non-natural" with the term "abnormally dangerous." Then, to
determine whether Cities Service Company's maintenance of the
slime reservoir was an abnormally dangerous activity, the court looked
to the factors suggested by Tentative Draft No. 10 of the Restate-
Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of Land, 3 CAMB. L.J. 376,
389-90 (1929). For an historical inquiry into the genesis of the non-natural use limita-
tion, see Newark, Non-Natural User and Rylands v. Fletcher, 24 MODERN L. REv. 557 (1961).
10. 312 So. 2d at 800. The court cited respected authority for its conclusion. See W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 509 (4th ed. 1971).
11. 312 So. 2d at 801. The court again relied on Prosser. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 78, at 509 (4th ed. 1971).
12. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 512 (4th ed. 1971). The Cities Service
court noted Prosser's definition. 312 So. 2d at 802.
One authority states: "[Non-natural] has been said to be equivalent to 'unreasonable,'
but more probably means 'extra-ordinary.' This test is an elastic one and is capable of
variation according to time and place." 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.4,
at 796 (1956) (footnote omitted). Another commentator, noting that non-natural is
a matter of relativity, states that "just as there is nothing which is at all times and in
all circumstances dangerous so it seems that there is scarcely anything which is in all
circumstances safe." Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of Land,
3 CAMB. L.J. 376, 387 (1929). And according to Foster and Keeton: "[F]or strict
liability to be applicable, it is not sufficient that the activity is merely dangerous. The
activity or condition must create an unusual, non-customary, one-sided risk and involve
a substance or operation which may go amiss despite all reasonable precautions." Foster
& Keeton, Liability Without Fault in Oklahoma, 3 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 172, 214-15 (1950).
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ment (Second) of Torts.1 3 Those factors are: (1) whether the activity
involves a high degree of risk of harm to the property of others, 14 (2)
whether the potential harm is likely to be great,15 (3) whether the
risk can be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care, 6 (4) whe-
ther the activity is a matter of common usage,'17 (5) whether the activi-
ty is inappropriate to the place where it is conducted, 8 and (6) whether
the activity has substantial value to the community. 9 The Cities Ser-
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS; § 520 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). The Tentative
Draft proposes certain changes to the language of the original Restatement, which
provides:
[Olne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person,
land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the un-
preventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that
which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised
to prevent the harm.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519, at 41 (1938). The Restatement also defines "ultrahazardous
activity":
An activity is ultrahazardous if it
(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of
others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and
(b) is not a matter of common usage.
Id. § 520. The Tentative Draft substitutes the words "abnormally dangerous" for the
word "ultrahazardous" and suggests six criteria for use in determining whether a
particular activity is abnormally dangerous. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519,
520 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
14. Maintenance of phosphate waste settling ponds involves a high degree of risk
of harm to the land of others. The court observed: "From the transcript of the testimony
taken in connection with the injunction proceedings, it is evident that despite the
best of care, earthen dams enclosing phosphate settling ponds do give way from time
to time without explanation." 312 So. 2d at 804.
15. The potential harm resulting from the escape of such phosphatic wastes is
likely to be great:
This is not clear water which is being impounded. Here, Cities Service introduced
water into its mining operation which when combined with phosphatic wastes
produced a phosphatic slime which had a high potential for damage to the en-
vironment. If a break occurred, it was to be expected that extensive damage would
be visited upon property many miles away. In this case, the damage, in fact,
extended almost to the mouth of the Peace River, which is far beyond the
phosphate mining area ....
Id. at 803.
16. The risk created by the maintenance of the slime reservoir cannot be eliminated
by the exercise of reasonable care. See note 23 infra.
17. The court apparently concluded that the maintenance of the reservoir is not
a matter of common usage. But see notes 21 and 22 and accompanying text infra.
18. Maintenance of the slime reservoir is clearly appropriate to the place where it
is. See notes 21 and 22 infra.
19. The activity is of significant value to the community. The affidavit filed in
opposition to the state's motion for partial summary judgment states:
It is common knowledge that the central Florida area, of which Polk County is
the hub, is the largest producer of phosphate rock in Florida and data compiled
by the Florida Phosphate Council, according to its report attached hereto as
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vice court considered all these factors -and concluded that the first
four favored the state while the last two favored Cities Service. 20
The court's reasoning may have been partly erroneous. The fourth
factor (whether the activity is a matter of common usage) probably
supports the argument that the slime reservoir was not abnormally
dangerous. Phosphate mining is the dominant industry in Polk Coun-
ty; 21 such mining is a reasonable and common usage of the land in
that county. Furthermore, the settling pond is an integral part of
the mining process and is a normally expected activity in the Polk
County area. 22
Even if the Cities Service court had acknowledged the common
use of settling ponds, it still would have held Cities Service Company
strictly liable for the damages caused. Though the court briefly con-
sidered the activity's prevalence, appropriateness, and economic utili-
ty, it was more impressed by the great risk of harm, the potential
magnitude of that harm, and the inefficacy of exercising reasonable
care.
23
Thus, the Cities Service court virtually disregarded the engineer-
ing necessity of the settling ponds, the suitability of the land for
phosphate mining, and the economic value of the industry to the Polk
Exhibit A, is to the effect that Florida produced over 80% of the Nation's market-
able phosphate rock and one-third of the world production thereof in 1973.
Affidavit of Harold N. Hedrick, State v. Cities Service Co., No. 71-4273 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Polk County, Nov. 8, 1974).
Exhibit A of the affidavit further states that by January 1, 1974, members of the
Florida Phosphate Council employed nearly 9,000 individuals. And two-thirds of those
employees lived in Polk and Hillsborough Counties. The exhibit further indicates that
the total phosphate industry investment in Florida is $3 billion, and that the impact
on Florida's economy is approaching S1 billion annually. See A. Mopus, THF FLORIDA
HANDBOOK 498 (15th ed. 1975).
20. 312 So. 2d at 803. See notes 14 through 19 supra.
21. In the affidavit filed in opposition to the state's motion for partial summary
judgment, the affiant stated: "The phosphate industry in and around the area where
the mine . . . is located . . . is the principal industry for such area .... ." Affidavit of
Harold N. Hedrick, State v. Cities Service Co., No. 71-4273 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Polk County,
Nov. 8, 1974).
22. In the affidavit filed in opposition to the state's motion for partial summary
judgment, the affiant described the purpose and necessity of maintaining settling
ponds. He concluded: "The phosphate waste settling pond is, accordingly, an integral
and expected part of the process by which man draws from the land and beneficiates
[sic] this important natural resource, and this is the normal use expected to be made
of the land in the Polk County area phosphate fields." Id.
23. The court stated:
In the final analysis, we are impressed by the magnitude of the activity and the
attendant risk of enormous damage. The impounding of billions of gallons of
phosphatic slimes behind earthen walls which are subject to breaking even with
the exercise of the best of care strikes us as being.. "abnormally dangerous . ...
312 So. 2d at 803.
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County community. But the importance of such factors has long been
judicially recognized in some jurisdictions. In factual situations strik-
ingly similar to that of Cities Service," courts have refused to charac-
terize as "non-natural" certain activities associated with irrigation,25
coal mining,26 and oil drilling.27 An example is Turner v. Big Lake Oil
Co.,2 8 in which a Texas court recognized the economic value of the
oil industry and refused to apply the Rylands rule to the escape of
polluted water from an oil-drilling operation.
In Turner the defendants were oil well operators who construct-
ed large earthen ponds to hold salt water from a well. The salt
water escaped from one or more of the ponds, passed over the ad-
joining turf of the plaintiffs, and entered a dry valley on the plaintiffs'
land. Several miles down the valley were natural holes where the
plaintiffs watered their stock. The salt water entered these water
holes, causing injury to cattle and sheep. The plaintiffs, alleging
negligence, brought an action for damages. The jury found that the
defendants permitted the salt water to escape onto the plaintiff's land,
but it acquitted the defendants of negligence. 29
The plaintiffs ultimately carried their appeal to the Texas Su-
preme Court where they urged that the defendants should be held
liable without negligence, under the Rylands rule. But the court re-
fused to apply the Rylands rule. It reasoned that Rylands had been re-
jected by the majority of American courts, 0 that the cases of escaping
fire and trespassing animals upon which Rylands relied had been re-
pudiated in the Texas law,"1 that conditions in Texas differed so
radically from those in England that Rylands was not properly ap-
plicable in Texas,3 2 and that the oil industry was so essential to the
24. For a review of cases involving the escape of water caused by a dam failure,
see Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 965 (1973).
25. See Anderson v. Rucker Bros., 183 P. 70 (Wash. 1919); Jacoby v. Town of City
of Gillette, 174 P.2d 505 (Wyo. 1946). Cf. Reter v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 482 P.2d
170 (Ore. 1971); Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936).
26. See Jones v. Robertson, 6 N.E. 890 (Ill. 1886); Kentucky Block Fuel Co. v.
Roberts, 268 S.W. 802 (Ky. 1925); Venzel v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 156 A. 240 (Pa. 1931).
27. See Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Stell, 124 P.2d 255 (Okla. 1942); Tidal Oil Co. v.
Pease, 5 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1931); Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936).
28. 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936). See also Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Stell, 124 P.2d 255
(Okla. 1942); Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Alred, 77 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1938); Cosden Oil Co. v.
Sides, 35 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Ct. App. 1931).
29. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936).
30. Id. at 222, 226. While the majority of American courts may have rejected Ry-
lands in 1936, the opposite is true today. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
31. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221, 223-24, 226 (Tex. 1936).
32. Id. at 225-26.
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economic prosperity of Texas that it should not be made an insurer
of the risks it creates.33
Just as the oil industry has a significant economic impact in Texas,
the phosphate industry has a significant economic impact in Florida.3t
And just as salt water is a necessary byproduct of oil production,,"
phosphate slimes are a necessary byproduct of phosphate mining.36
Clearly, if the Turner court had considered the Turner facts in light
of the six criteria of Tentative Draft No. 10, it would have emphasized
the last three and not the first three as did the Cities Service court.3 7
One authority says that Turner is "undoubtedly best explained
upon the basis of a different community view which makes such
things [properly conducted oil wells] 'natural' to the particular locali-
ty."38 Arguably, properly conducted phosphate mines are equally
"natural" to the locality of the Cities Service mine. But the Cities
Service court determined that the slime reservoir was a non-natural use
of land such as to invoke the doctrine of strict liability.3 9
The Cities Service court implemented its determination by affirm-
ing the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment for the
plaintiff. But the appellate court noted that an activity's status as
natural or non-natural is ordinarily "one which would require the
trial court's evaluation of all of the pertinent factors at a trial.' ' 40 The
court's approval of the summary judgment is subject to question, for
summary judgment is no substitute for a trial.4 1 Summary judgment
is proper only where the pleadings, depositions, and other papers on
file reveal no genuine issue as to any material fact and show that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4 1 In Florida,
summary judgment is never proper if the evidence raises the slightest
doubt upon any issue of material fact or permits different reasonable
inferences.43 Despite the conclusion of the Cities Service court, it is
33. Id. at 226.
34. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
35. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221, 226 (Tex. 1936).
36. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
37. See notes 13 through 20 and accompanying text supra.
38. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 511 (4th ed. 1971).
39. 312 So. 2d at 803.
40. Id.
41. Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 182 So. 2d 292, 296 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1966); Alepgo Corp. v. Pozin, 114 So. 2d 645, 647 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959), cert.
denied, 117 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1960).
42. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). See Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966); Byrd v.
Leach, 226 So. 2d 866, 868 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Reserve Ins. Co. v. Earle W.
Day & Co., 190 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Smith v. City of Daytona
Beach, 121 So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
43. Shollenberger v. Baskin, 227 So. 2d 79, 81 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Byrd
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not apparent that Cities Service Company's maintenance of the slime
reservoir was indeed a non-natural use of the land. The issue was
highly disputed,' 4 and different reasonable inferences were possible.
If, however, the natural versus non-natural determination is one more
properly made by the court than by the trier of fact, the Cities Ser-
vice court's approval of the summary judgment is less objectionable.
The pivotal question is whether the determination is a matter of law
or a matter of fact.
The tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, upon
which the Cities Service court so heavily relied, includes a comment
which suggests that the natural versus non-natural determination is
a matter of law. The comment states that the imposition of strict
liability "calls for a decision of the court . .. and . . . is no part of
the province of the jury . . . ,,45 If it is for the court to determine
whether a particular activity is abnormally dangerous, is it also for
the court to resolve each of the six factors"8 suggested by the tentative
draft? At what point do the disputed issues finally boil down to genuine
issues of material fact?
Perhaps the natural versus non-natural determination is one best
v. Leach, 226 So. 2d 866, 868 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Dickinson v. Allen, 215
So. 2d 747, 749 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 182 So. 2d
292, 297 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So. 2d 307, 310 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
44. See Brief for Appellant at 12-14, Brief for Appellee at 37-40, Cities Service Co.
v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See also affidavit of Harold N. Hed-
rick, State v. Cities Service Co., No. 71-4273 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Polk County, Nov. 8, 1974).
45. The full text of the comment follows:
Whether the activity is an abnormally dangerous one is to be determined by
the court, upon consideration of all the factors listed in this Section, and the
weight given to each which it merits upon the facts in evidence. In this it differs
from questions of negligence. Whether the conduct of the defendent has been
that of a reasonable man of ordinary prudence, or in the alternative has been
negligent, is ordinarily an issue to be left to the jury. The standard of the
hypothetical reasonable man is essentially a jury standard, in which the court
interferes only in the clearest cases. A jury is fully competent to decide whether
the defendant has properly driven his horse, or operated his train, or guarded
his machiney [sic], or repaired his premises, or dug a hole. The imposition of
strict liability, on the other hand, involves a characterization of the defendant's
activity or enterprise itself, and a decision as to whether he is free to conduct it
at all without becoming liabke [sic] for the harm which ensues even though he has
used all reasonable care. This calls for a decision of the court; and it is no part
of the province of the jury to decide whether an industrial enterprise upon
which the community's prosperity might depend is located in the wrong place,
or whether such an activity as blasting is to be permitted without liability in
the center of Chicago.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 520, comment at 68 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
46. See notes 13-20 supra.
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made by the trier of fact.4 7 The resolution of certain factual issues
is prerequisite to resolution of the determinative factors suggested by
Tentative Draft No. 10.48 Furthermore, Prosser has admitted that the
natural versus non-natural determination depends on community at-
titudes.49 It is submitted that a consensus of the jury is more indicative
of community attitude than is the opinion of a single judge. Of course,
there are circumstances in which activities conducted in one com-
munity may adversely affect the interests of neighboring communities.
Such were the circumstances in the Cities Service case.' 0
Perhaps the result reached in Cities Service does justify the court's
approval of the summary judgment for the state. Spills from earthen
dams retaining phosphate slimes occur often in phosphate mining.51
The instant case is not the first litigation resulting from a slime spill. 2
47. The proposition is not without authoritative support. In an English court
considering the applicability of the Rylands rule, Lord Porter discussed what is a
dangerous use and what is a non-natural use:
Indeed, there is a considerable body of case law dealing with these questions and
a series of findings or assumptions as to what is sufficient to establish their
existence. . . . [E]ach seems to be a question of fact subject to a ruling of the
judge as to whether the particular object can be dangerous or the particular use
can be non-natural, and in deciding this question I think that all the circum-
stances of the time and place and practice of mankind must be taken into
consideration so that what might be regarded as dangerous or non-natural may
vary according to those circumstances.
Read v. J. Lyons & Co., [1947] A.C. 156, 176. Consider the following:
The true distinction is not, it is submitted, between the dangerous or non-
dangerous character of the thing inherently, but between those circumstances
in which the defendant will be allowed to deny the dangerous character of his
act or undertaking and those in which he will not. And it seems just the kind
of question to which a jury can provide the best answer: Was the plaintiff -entitled
to impose the risk of loss upon another without: himself running the risk of
paying any damages?
Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of Land, 3 CAMB. L.J. 376,
389 (1929).
Whether a particular act constitutes negligence is an ultimate fact to be inferred by
the jury from the evidence submitted. Perhaps whether a particular fact is non-natural
is also such an ultimate fact. Cf. Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 16, 46 (1973). But cf. State ex
rel. Shevin v. Tampa Elec. Co., 291 So. 2d 45, 47-48 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). Contra,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, comment at 68 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964)
[quoted in note 45 supra].
48. See notes 13-20 supra.
49. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
50. In the words of the court: "If a break occurred, it was to be expected that
extensive damage would be visited upon property many miles away. In this case, the
damage, in fact, extended almost to the mouth of the Peace River, which is far beyond
the phosphate mining area described in the Cities Service affidavit." 312 So. 2d at 803.
51. Brief for Appellee at 4, Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975).
52. See Caldwell v. American Cyanamid Co., 32 Fla. Supp. 163 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
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It can be presumed that similar spills will occur in the future. But in
view of Cities Service, it is unlikely that the mining companies will
be eager to go to trial. Settlements will more likely be negotiated, thus
relieving the already overburdened courts. If such a case does reach
trial, the court may safely grant a summary judgment for the com-
plaining party because such uses of land, at least in the Second District,
are now non-natural as a matter of law.
Thus, Cities Service Co. v. State is a significant decision in
several respects. First, it represents the first application by a Florida
appellate court of the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine of strict liability
for the hazardous use of land. Second, its determination as a matter
of law that maintenance of a slime reservoir by a phosphate mining
company is a non-natural use of land will encourage out-of-court
settlements of future claims. Last, the decision expresses a growing
concern on the part of the courts for preservation of the ecological
environment. Through application of a judicially created doctrine, the
Cities Service court has created a means by which environmental
pollution can be discouraged if not prevented; and by which non-
natural users of land must insure against the risks they create.
J. STEPHEN O'HARA, JR.
Hillsborough County, Jan. 7, 1969); Ague v. American Agricultural Chem. Co., 5 Fla.
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